Khalid Quyyum Awan known as Khalid Awan canadian

 
Khalid Quyyum Awan known as Khalid Awan

Khalid Quyyum Awan known as Khalid Awan belongs to great Awan family in Khushab .His father ,Malik Abdul Quyyum was a famous great ppp leader in Khushab and Sargodha .Malik Abdul Quyyum Awan was a very deep friend of ex-Prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,because of personal deep friendship with Bhutto he visited several times Larkana ,Karachi,Lahore,Islamabad and also he has very deep ties with Piracha,Noon,Tiwana,Aahir ,Shah,Syed Qureshi,Kahloon families.After the death of Malik Abdul Quyyum Awan ,his son Khalid Awan was a active political student [ppp ] leader of Khushab , Bhalwal ,Sargodha and Lahore. After completing his education, He shifted Karachi where he got education in Law. After completing his law, he became very famous lawyer,attorny in Karachi as well as in Lahore,Sargodha,Bhalwal and Khushab.
 http://www.nysun.com/article/37251
 http://www.canada.com/globaltv/bc/story.html?id=8bb9cb53-9fad-49ba-941d-0c9dff7d477e&k=36016

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Khalid Awan 's real situation ,An other Mehr Arar

muhammad ali 15.Oct.2007 12:14

Khalid Awan
Khalid Awan

Please ;-Look into these points
1;-The new charges,as well as the previous ones,were commercial in nature.
2;-It was stupid to plead guilty on advice of the attorney .Basically ,you had ineffective assistance of counsel and your pleas ‘as made under ‘threat,duress and coercion’ with proper counsel via fraud by the attorney and fraud by the court.
3;-You had 14 months to go ,applied for treaty transfer ,learned of error on citizenship as per canada.
4;-The FBI committed the crime of ‘obstruction of justice’ in not returning your ID.,passports etc so that you could effectively be returned to canada.
5;-FBOP ignored citizenship correction request by Canadian Consulate Office thereby causing injury.
6;-Upon arriving at MDC,and after the phones calls by RCMP,etc.,You were interrogated by AUSA and FBI without an attorney ……. in violation of Due process of Law.
The comment made by AUSA in respect to your family being arrested if you refused to answer is fraud and every thing you may have stated in that interrogation was done under threat,duress and coercion.
8;-The continued harassment ,intimidation and otherwise was done to get you to talk ,even though you wanted them to not harass your family.
9;-After March 15,2006, being arrested for the 3rd time, before being deported to canada,being charged with ‘material support to a foreign terrorist’ and money laudering may have been done to as a custom and policy to deprive your of Rights and otherwise.
10;- The indictment could be illegal ,null and void.Of the three new charges, what do you believe is the material substance of the charges?.Are you able to do up an affidavit of the facts of the case/charges and the charges???.
11;-Attorneys and AUSA’s lie, as per the plea agreement and the money laudering issue!
12;-Yes ,I would agree that you have been singled out discriminated against , but situation like this ,but with Americans , happen everyday here in America!
13;-You may not understand American law, but never trust an Attorney!

see original facts,

gondale 15.Oct.2007 12:31

Please ;-Look into these points
1;-The new charges,as well as the previous ones,were commercial in nature.
2;-It was stupid to plead guilty on advice of the attorney .Basically ,you had ineffective assistance of counsel and your pleas ‘as made under ‘threat,duress and coercion’ with proper counsel via fraud by the attorney and fraud by the court.
3;-You had 14 months to go ,applied for treaty transfer ,learned of error on citizenship as per canada.
4;-The FBI committed the crime of ‘obstruction of justice’ in not returning your ID.,passports etc so that you could effectively be returned to canada.
5;-FBOP ignored citizenship correction request by Canadian Consulate Office thereby causing injury.
6;-Upon arriving at MDC,and after the phones calls by RCMP,etc.,You were interrogated by AUSA and FBI without an attorney ……. in violation of Due process of Law.
The comment made by AUSA in respect to your family being arrested if you refused to answer is fraud and every thing you may have stated in that interrogation was done under threat,duress and coercion.
8;-The continued harassment ,intimidation and otherwise was done to get you to talk ,even though you wanted them to not harass your family.
9;-After March 15,2006, being arrested for the 3rd time, before being deported to canada,being charged with ‘material support to a foreign terrorist’ and money laudering may have been done to as a custom and policy to deprive your of Rights and otherwise.
10;- The indictment could be illegal ,null and void.Of the three new charges, what do you believe is the material substance of the charges?.Are you able to do up an affidavit of the facts of the case/charges and the charges???.
11;-Attorneys and AUSA’s lie, as per the plea agreement and the money laudering issue!
12;-Yes ,I would agree that you have been singled out discriminated against , but situation like this ,but with Americans , happen everyday here in America!
13;-You may not understand American law, but never trust an Attorney!

KHALID AWAN IS A BIG FRAUD.

ASAD TIWANA 08.Mar.2008 00:05

Khalid Awan is a big fraud and a rogue. He has no connections with the families he has mentioned.
He is only trying to disgrace our family. How can we have a contact with a terrorist and a fraud.
He was a fraud in Pakistan as well as Canada. Everything written in his favour are all lies and
has been written by a paid computer master.He is getting what he deserves.

case facts of khalid awan canadian

mohsingondale 28.Mar.2008 22:56

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------X
United States of America
CR–06-0154 (CPS)
- against - MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Khalid Awan,
Defendant.
----------------------------------------X
SIFTON, Senior Judge.
After a jury trial, defendant, Khalid Awan was found guilty
on December 20, 2006 of (1) one count of conspiring to provide
material support and resources, knowing and intending that such
support would be used in preparation for and in carrying out a
conspiracy to murder, kidnap or maim a person or persons outside
of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) and 18
U.S.C. § 956(a); (2) one count of actually providing material
support and resources, knowing and intending that such support
would be used in preparation for and in carrying out a conspiracy
to murder, kidnap or maim a person or persons outside of the
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 956(a); and (3) one count of knowingly and intentionally
transporting, transmitting and transferring monetary instruments
and funds from a place in the United States to a place outside
the United States, with the intention of promoting an offense
against foreign nation, involving murder and destruction of
-2-
property by means of explosive or fire in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii). Now before this Court is defendant’s motion
for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29 or for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33.
Background
On October 25, 2001, FBI agents arrested Khalid Awan at a
house in Garden City, New York on a charge of credit card fraud.
He was indicted on those charges on December 4, 2001; a
superseding indictment was filed on May 7, 2002. On March 17,
2003 defendant pleaded guilty to one count of credit card fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029. Defendant was sentenced on
October 28, 2004 to sixty months incarceration. A judgment of
conviction reflecting that sentence was entered on November 8,
2004.
Defendant was scheduled to be released from his 2004
sentence in March, 2006. However, on March 8, 2006 he was again
indicted. A superseding indictment was filed August 1, 2006 and
a second superseding indictment filed October 23, 2006. The
three-count indictment second superseding reads as follows:
Count One:
In or about and between 1998 and February 2005, both dates
-3-
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a)(2005).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a)(2001).
being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District
of New York and elsewhere, the defendant KHALID AWAN,
together with others, did knowingly and intentionally
conspire to provide material support and resources, to wit:
currency, monetary instruments, financial services and
personnel, knowing and intending that they were to be used
in preparation for, and in carrying out, a conspiracy to
commit at a place outside the United States an act that
would constitute the offense of murder, kidnapping or
maiming if committed in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of Title 18
United States Code, Section 956(a).1
Count Two:
In or about and between 1998 and November 6, 2001, both
dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern
District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant KHALID
AWAN did knowingly and intentionally provide material
support and resources, to wit: currency, monetary
instruments, financial services and personnel, knowing and
intending that they were to be used in preparation for, and
in carrying out, a conspiracy to commit at a place outside
the United States an act that would constitute the offense
of murder, kidnapping or maiming if committed in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section
956(a).2
Count Three:
In or about and between 1998 and November 6, 2001, both
dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern
District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant KHALID
AWAN did knowingly and intentionally transport, transmit and
transfer monetary instruments and funds from a place in the
United States to a place outside the United States with the
intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity, to wit: an offense against a foreign nation, to
wit: India, involving murder as defined by Indian Penal Code
-4-
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A).
Section 300 and destruction of property by means of
explosive or fire as defined by Indian Penal Code Section
435.3
Defendant was arraigned on these charges on March 16, 2006,
August 9, 2006 and October 30, 2006. A jury trial began before
the undersigned on December 4, 2006 and concluded with a verdict
of guilt on all three counts on December 20, 2006.
Discussion
I. Rule 29 Motion
At the close of the government’s case, the defendant moved
for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, at which time the Court reserved decision on
that question. Under Rule 29, “the court . . . must enter a
judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).
On such a motion, the defendant “bears a heavy burden,” since
“evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
government and all permissible inferences must be drawn in its
favor.” U.S. v. RW Prof’l Leasing Serv.s Corp., 452 F.Supp.2d
159, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In addition, “[t]he court also must
defer to the jury's resolution of witness credibility and, where
-5-
there is conflicting testimony, to its selection between
competing inferences . . . . [moreover] the court must consider
the evidence in its totality, and not in isolation.” Id.
Accordingly, “[t]he jury's verdict must be sustained, if any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” U.S. v. Finley, 245 F.3d
199, 202-3 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Where “either of the two results, a reasonable doubt
or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, the court must let
the jury decide the matter.” U.S. v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114
(2d Cir. 2000). “[T]he court may enter a judgment of acquittal
only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime
alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” U.S. v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d
122, 130 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). That said, “a conviction based on speculation and
surmise alone cannot stand . . . . [and] the government must do
more than introduce evidence at least as consistent with
innocence as with guilt.” U.S. v. D'Amato. 39 F.3d 1249, 1256 (2d
Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
A. Count One - Conspiracy to Provide Material Support
Defendant offers several reasons why the evidence introduced
at trial was insufficient to establish a guilty verdict for Count
-6-
One.
1. Uncorroborated Statements
When the government relies on statements or admissions of
the defendant, such statements require corroboration to support a
conviction. U.S. v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2006).
However,
the corroborating evidence need not [itself] prove the
essential elements of the crime. Rather, the
corroboration must prove that the confession was
reliable, and must prove any elements of the crime to
which the defendant did not confess . . . . [T]he
confession, if proven reliable, may serve as the only
evidence reaching the corpus delicti [“body of the
crime]. . . . Although the corroborative evidence need
not independently prove the injury or harm resulting
from the crime, it must support the essential facts
admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of
their truth . . . . The modern corroboration rule
requires only that there be substantial independent
evidence which would tend to establish the
trustworthiness of the statement.
Id. at 118-19 (2d Cir. 2006).
There are two types of statements addressed by the
corroboration rule:
those that bear insufficient indicia of reliability as
proof of the defendant's commission of the offense to
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and those that, considering the nature and the context
of the defendant's words, demonstrate his commission of
the offense so reliably that, without need of other
supporting evidence, they can support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
U.S. v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 355 (2d Cir. 2000). “Some examples
-7-
4 Defendant’s statements to Ross, Harjit and Mian constitute admissions
which help establish his knowledge of the KCF’s violent activities and the
fact that he met with individuals who gave him money which he transferred
money from the United States to Pakistan on the KCF’s behalf.
Ross testified, among other things, that the defendant told him he had
met with Paramjit Singh Panjwar (“Panjwar”), that he was aware of Panjwar’s
violent activities, that Panjwar was the leader of the Khalistan Commando
Force (“KCF”) and that the KCF was involved in killing people in India.
Transcript, 888-901. The defendant also described meetings and calls he had
the KCF sympathizers, identified Gurbax Singh as one of the KCF supporters he
met with and told Ross he had transferred $60,000 to $70,000 to Panjwar.
Transcript, 910-13. Further, the defendant told investigators that he knew the
money “was going to be used for bad things . . . shooting and killing of
innocent people . . . in India.” Transcript, 914.
According to Harjit’s testimony, between June 2003 and November 2004, he
and the defendant had several conversations about the KCF, both recorded and
unrecorded. In those conversations, the defendant discussed his knowledge of
Panjwar and the KCF’s methods, training and violent activities and his support
of the KCF and told Harjit he would take him to Pakistan to receive military
training. Transcript, 669-696, 738-801; Government Exhibits, 106A, 106B, 106C,
106D, 106E, 107E. According to Harjit’s testimony, the recorded conversations
make specific references to, among other things, the number of people Panjwar
claims he has killed, Panjwar’s attempt on the Indian Prime Minister’s life, a
meeting the defendant had with Panjwar and ISI officers in which Panjwar
described his close relationship to the defendant and in which an ISI officer
referred to the defendant a “silent mujahid,” the possibility for receiving
military training in Pakistan, and the means through which the defendant
transferred money to Panjwar. Transcript, 752-53, 763-65, 768, 784-787; GX
106B, 9-10, 18, 21; 106C, 4; 107A, 4-5.
In Mian’s testimony, he said that the defendant had told him that he
sent money to “Paramjit Singh,” a “freedom fighter” working for the Khalistan
movement who was wanted for murder in India. Transcript, 587-89.
of self-corroborating statements - statements so reliable in and
of themselves that they require no corroborative evidence - are
statements made prior to the commission of the crime . . . and
statements made between co-conspirators to accomplish the ends of
their criminal enterprise.” Irving, 452 F.3d at 118 (internal
citations omitted).
According to the defendant, incriminating statements made by
the defendant to Investigator John Ross in 2006, to Harjit Singh
(“Harjit”) in 2003 and 2004, and to Iftikhar Mian in 2000 or 2001
are not self-corroborating.4 The defendant argues that the
-8-
government has provided no bank records, documents or forensic
evidence to corroborate the defendant’s statements.
However, as the government argues, there is both testimonial
and documentary evidence which establishes the reliability of
each statement and renders them corroborated.
First, the defendant’s statements to Ross, Harjit and Mian
corroborate one another. In conversations with each of these
individuals, the defendant, according to their testimony and the
recorded conversations introduced at trial, admitted to knowledge
of KCF leader Paramjit Singh Panjwar (“Panjwar”) and the
Khalistan Commando Force’s (“KCF”) violent activities and mission
and to sending the KCF money from the United States. Though the
defendant argues that these statements cannot corroborate each
other, the consistency of the admissions made on different
occasions over the course of five years in entirely different
contexts (to a government investigator, to a friend before
defendant’s arrest, and twice to a fellow inmate) tend to
establish that each is indeed trustworthy.
Second, there was substantial other evidence introduced at
trial which supports the essential facts admitted by the
defendant. Gurbax Singh (“Gurbax”) and Baljinder Singh
(“Baljinder”), confessed supporters of the KCF, both testified to
using the defendant as a means to transfer money to the KCF,
corroborating the defendant’s statements to government
-9-
5 The defendant does not argue that his recorded phone conversations
with Panjwar are uncorroborated statements. Those conversations are selfcorroborating
as statements made a co-conspirator in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
investigators that various Sikhs delivered money to him which he
sent to Pakistan and defendant’s recollection that one of those
who delivered the money was Gurbax. Transcript, 213-217, 436-446.
Baljinder also testified that the defendant told him that Panjwar
was a “very good friend” and that he would send the money
Baljinder gave him to Panjwar, while Gurbax recalled seeing a
photograph of Panjwar and his family at the defendant’s home.
Transcript, 215, 441. In addition, Baljinder testified that
Panjwar told him that the defendant was a “trustworthy” and a
“very good friend” who had done this type of “work” for him
before. Transcript, 446-47. The government also introduced tape
recorded phone calls between the defendant and Panjwar in which
the defendant vouched for Harjit’s reliability. GX 101A, 5.5
Further, the government introduced supporting evidence, including
documents recovered from the defendant, listing contact
information for KCF members and supporters, including “Paramjit
Singh,” and a photograph of Panjwar. GX 7A; 7C; 9C. Finally,
the government introduced bank records showing wire transfers
from the Tee Jay’s Fashion account at HSBC bank to Habib Bank in
Pakistan and checks drawn from the Tee Jay’s Fashion account at
HSBC negotiated at Habib Bank, corroborating defendant’s
-10-
6 Mian testified that defendant told him that Butt was a friend of the
defendant’s who ran a clothing store called Tee Jay’s Fashions. Transcript,
601.
statement to investigators that he has access to accounts
controlled by a Mr. Butt at HSBC bank which he used to transfer
money to Panjwar through an account at Habib Bank.6 GX 8A; 8B;
8C; 8D; 10. Even though this evidence does not prove all the
elements of each crime, it is sufficient to establish the
reliability of the defendant’s statements regarding his knowledge
of the mission and methods of the KCF, as well as his efforts to
support the KCF by providing funds and personnel.
2. Meeting of the Minds/Specific Intent
The defendant also contends that the evidence at trial did
not sufficiently establish a meeting of the minds between the
defendant and his alleged coconspirators to further a conspiracy
in India to murder, kidnap or maim. Defendant also argues that
the government failed to prove that the defendant provided
material support, “knowing and intending” that the support was to
be used in carrying out the conspiracy to murder, kidnap or maim.
However, taken as a whole, the evidence more than
sufficiently supports a finding by the jury that the defendant
and his fellow conspirators knew about the purposes and violent
methods of the KCF and knowingly joined in a conspiracy to
support the KCF with the intent of furthering its attempts to
-11-
7 Though conceding that motive is not an element of the offense, the
defendant notes the “startling” lack of a motive in the record and argues that
the lack of a motive for the defendant to assist a violent Sikh conspiracy in
India bears on the question of intent and agreement to join the conspiracy.
Given the significant evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the
defendant did indeed knowingly participate in the conspiracy, the lack of a
murder, maim or kidnap individuals in India in furtherance of its
political objectives. The defendant demonstrated his knowledge
of the KCF’s violent activities when he told Harjit about attacks
carried out by the KCF in India and how the KCF was trained and
supported by the Pakistani intelligence services (the “ISI”).
Defendant also described to Harjit personal details about
Panjwar, including the number of people he was responsible for
killing, the number of bombings he had committed, his
participation in a plot to assassinate the Indian Prime Minister,
and how he lived in Pakistan and was supported by the ISI; much
of this detail was repeated to government investigators when
defendant was interviewed in 2006. Transcript, 680-84, 675-76,
679-80, 748-49, 751-53, 794-96, 896-902, 905. The defendant told
Harjit that the money he sent was to support the KCF “who were
fighting in India.” Transcript, 686. The defendant admitted to
government investigators that he knew the money he sent would be
used for “shooting and killing of innocent people . . . in
India,” while Mian testified that the defendant told him that he
sent money to a “freedom fighter” named “Paramjit Singh” who was
working for the movement to establish a separate Sikh state and
who was wanted for murder in India. Transcript, 914, 587-89.7
-12-
demonstrated motive is of no relevance. See U.S. v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183,
185 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) (where motive is not an element of the crime, “the lack
of evidence on this point does not, as a matter of law, preclude conviction”).
However, the defendant told investigators that he wanted to associate with
Panjwar “because he knew Mr. Panjwar was a terrorist,” raising a fair
inference that defendant, as a “silent mujahid,” sought an association with
terrorists in order to pursue his own political objectives vis a vis that
government of India. Transcript, 763, 981.
3. Period of Criminal Activity
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
establish that the defendant committed the charged offenses in
the time period set forth in the indictment, namely between 1998
and February 2005. According to the defendant, Baljinder did not
provide any dates for the meetings he had with the defendant and
Gurbax was uncertain whether he met with the defendant in 1999 or
2000, testifying that the fundraising events were held in “1999
or 2000.” Transcript, 208.
Despite Gurbax’s uncertainty, the evidence introduced at
trial supports a conclusion that the meeting with Gurbax and
Baljinder occurred after September 2000 since they testified that
they met the defendant at his house in Garden City, which the
government demonstrated the defendant did not own until September
2000. Transcript, 1019-20; GX, 7I. In addition, Harjit testified
that the defendant told him that he had arranged for a $21,000
wire transfer to a KCF fighter shortly before his arrest, which
occurred on October 25, 2001. Transcript, 686-88.
Further, the evidence supports a finding that the defendant
continued to participate in the conspiracy even after his 2001
-13-
8 Prior to October, 2001 18 U.S.C. § 3286(a) did not include § 2339A in
the extended limitations period. The application of the eight year
limitations period to defendant’s prosecution does not create an ex post facto
problem since “[t]he long-standing rule in this circuit is that Congress has
the power to extend the period of limitations without running afoul of the ex
post facto clause, provided the original period has not already run.” U.S. v.
Morgan, 113 F.3d 1230 (2d Cir. 1997); see also U.S. v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342,
1351 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing cases). When Congress extended the period of
limitations in 2001, the period of limitations on the defendant’s activities
had not yet run.
arrest by trying to recruit Harjit to join the KCF in 2003 and by
introducing Harjit to Panjwar in 2004. Accordingly, the evidence
is sufficient to support a finding by the jury that the defendant
actively participated in the conspiracy to provide funds and
personnel after 1998 and before the February 2005.
4. Statute of Limitations
The defendant argues that the limitations period for Count
One is five years and that the government failed to produce
evidence of an offense within the five years period prior to his
indictment in March, 2006.
The limitations period for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A,
the statutory basis for Counts One and Two, which is eight years,
not five. While 18 U.S.C. § 3282 provides a five year
limitations period for most non-capital crimes, 18 U.S.C. §
3286(a) provides an eight year limitations period for any offense
“listed” in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), such as 18 U.S.C. §
2339A.8 However, even if the statute of limitations was only
five years, the government has, as discussed above, introduced
-14-
9 Defendant does not contend on this motion that the Court should have
given an jury instruction regarding the statute of limitations. The defendant
requested that the Court instruct the jury that the overt acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy alleged in Count One must be found to have occurred within
five years of the indictment date. At the charging conference, which occurred
several days before the jury instructions were given, I alerted the parties to
18 U.S.C. § 3286 and inquired if there was any need to instruct on the
limitations period given that timeframe. Both sides were given an opportunity
to review the issue and the defendant did not object at that time or take
exception to the charge. Transcript, 1079, 1081-82, 1096. The defendant never
requested any instruction, even orally, regarding the statute of limitations
with regards to Count Two or Count Three. Accordingly, he has waived any
objection to the lack of a charge or jury finding on the subject. See Lavoie
v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir.1992) (“Failure to
object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury
retiring results in a waiver of that objection.”); U.S. v. Grammatikos, 633
F.2d 1013, 1022 -1023 (2d Cir. 1980) (where “no written or timely oral
requests for [a statute of limitations] instruction[] were made, and the
record reveals that no objections were raised to the court's failure to
include such charges . . . we have long and consistently held such issues to
have been waived).
evidence which supports a finding that the defendant continued to
provide financial services to the KCF into the summer and fall of
2001, well within five years period prior to March, 2006.
Evidence of the attempt to recruit Harjit in 2003 alone supports
the conclusion that the defendant acted in furtherance of the
conspiracy within the limitations period. See U.S. v. Scop, 846
F.2d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The statute of limitations runs
from the date of the last overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy”).9
5. Sending Money
Defendant further argues that there is insufficient evidence
that the defendant sent money to Panjwar or the KCF.
However, defendant’s own admissions again support the jury’s
-15-
finding. According to the testimony of Ross, defendant himself
admitted to investigators that after he transmitted money to
Panjwar he would call him to confirm receipt, and Baljinder
testified that Panjwar told him that the defendant “already did
this work for me,” referring to sending money. Transcript, 916,
446-47. Defendant also discussed various accounts and methods
for getting funds to the KCF with Harjit and investigators. This
evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant
sent money to the KCF, even without evidence of wire transfers
directly connecting the defendant to transferred funds.
6. Conspiracy to Provide Personnel
Finally, the defendant argues that since the only testimony
bearing on the issue of the provision of personnel was from
Harjit, who testified that the defendant tried to recruit him to
work for the KCF after Harjit was released from prison, the
evidence was insufficient for a finding of guilt.
However, as the defendant himself notes, “[a] conviction may
be sustained on the basis of the testimony of a single
accomplice, so long as that testimony is not incredible on its
face and is capable of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” U.S. v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1993).
Nothing about Harjit’s testimony renders it incredible as a
matter of law. Harjit’s testimony about his unrecorded
-16-
10 The defendant states, without support, that since Count Two is a
substantive count,“the government’s burden is arguably higher that [sic]
proving conspiracy in Count One.” Even if this were the case, the evidence
produced at trial is sufficient for a finding of guilt.
discussions with the defendant is corroborated by the May 2004
recorded conversations between the defendant and Harjit in which
the defendant confirmed they could train in Pakistan after they
left prison. The phone recordings in which the defendant told
Panjwar that he had checked out Harjit before introducing hims
adds further support a finding that the defendant was recruiting
for the KCF.
B. Count Two - Provision of Material Support
In arguing that he should be acquitted under Rule 29 on
Count Two, defendant relies primarily on the arguments he made
for acquittal on Count One.10 Accordingly, for the reasons set
forth with regards to Count One the evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction for the defendant on Count Two.
Defendant also argues, again with regard to Count Two, that
the government did not provide sufficient evidence that the
defendant committed the charged offense between 1998 and October
25, 2001. However, as discussed above, the government produced
evidence that the defendant engaged in funds transfers to the KCF
beginning at least in 2000 and continuing into mid-2001.
Further, no request to charge, contention, or exception was taken
with respect to the statute of limitations applicable to Count
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11 Defendant states that the estimates ranged from $2,000 to $800,000.
However, the $2,000 figure was only what Gurbax testified to and is not an
estimate of the total amount provided by the defendant.
12 Neither 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) nor 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) lists any
threshold amount of money.
Two.
The defendant also argues that since government witnesses
provided “widely divergent estimates of the amounts [the
defendant] allegedly transferred,” ranging from $70,000 to
$800,000, these varying estimates, coupled with the lack of
documentary evidence to corroborate them, “can in no way be
considered anything but ‘speculation or surmise’ insufficient to
support a guilty verdict.” Transcript, 913.11 However, the
defendant himself explained the disparity, telling Ross that he
had actually transferred $60,000 to $70,000 and that he may have
told others that he transferred up to $800,000 but that was not
true. Transcript, 913. Moreover, the statute does not require a
finding of a specific amount of money transferred to establish
guilt.12 Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that the defendant did transfer funds to the KCF.
C. Count Three - Money Laundering
In arguing that he should be acquitted under Rule 29 on
Count Three, defendant relies on the arguments he made for
acquittal on Counts One and Two. As discussed above, the
evidence, and the defendant’s own admissions, support a finding
-18-
that he transferred money between 1998 and November 6, 2001 with
the intent of promoting the murder of individuals in India.
The statute of limitations for Count Three is five years
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The evidence, as discussed above, is
more than sufficient for a finding that the defendant continued
his funding activities into at least the summer of 2001, within
five years of the indictment. Further, no request to charge,
contention, or exception was taken with respect to the statute of
limitations applicable to Count Three.
II. Rule 33 Motion
Defendant also moves for a new trial under Rule 33 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Rule 33, “the court
may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Rule 33 gives the
trial court “broad discretion to set aside a jury verdict and
order a new trial to avert a perceived miscarriage of justice.”
U.S. v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992). However,
this discretion is to be “exercised sparingly,” Id. at 1414, and
while “the district court may weigh the evidence and credibility
of witnesses . . . [it] may not wholly usurp the jury's role.”
U.S. v. Espaillet, 380 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal
citations omitted). “It is only where exceptional circumstances
can be demonstrated that the trial judge may intrude upon the
-19-
jury function of credibility assessment.” Sanchez, 969 F.2d at
1414. “An example of exceptional circumstances is where
testimony is patently incredible or defies physical realities,
although the district court's rejection of trial testimony by
itself does not automatically permit Rule 33 relief.” U.S. v.
Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). “Indeed, this standard has been
described standard has been described as a heavy burden . . . and
it is well-settled that motions for new trials are not favored
and should be granted only with great caution.” U.S. v. RW Prof’l
Leasing Serv.s Corp., 452 F.Supp.2d 159, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). “The ultimate test
on a Rule 33 motion is whether letting a guilty verdict stand
would be a manifest injustice. The trial court must be satisfied
that competent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence in the
record supports the jury verdict.” Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The defendant argues that the Court should grant this motion
and order a new trial on all three counts of the conviction,
since permitting the guilty verdict to stand would be a “manifest
injustice.” In particular, the defendant argues that the
credibility of the government’s witnesses should be evaluated in
light of an absence of corroborative documentary and forensic
evidence.
-20-
None of the arguments made by the defendant present
“exceptional circumstances” or demonstrate “manifest injustice.”
Fact testimony from admitted felons and co-conspirators,
testifying pursuant to cooperation agreements, is common in
criminal cases, nor is it particularly disturbing that Mian may
have initially lied to government investigators before revealing
what he knew about the defendant. Moreover, the testimony of each
witness was substantially corroborated by the testimony of the
other witnesses, the tape recordings introduced into evidence and
the testimony of Ross regarding defendant’s admissions. Nor is
there any reason to believe that the jury convicted on grounds of
less than reasonable doubt because the case was described as
involving terrorism. The jury was carefully instructed that
should not allow emotional feelings elicited by the word
“terrorism” to enter into its consideration of the offense. The
statute under which the defendant was prosecuted in Counts One
and Two, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, is, for better or worse, entitled
“Providing material support to terrorists” and the alleged
activities of the KCF, which include killing innocent civilians,
clearly fall within the common understanding of the term
terrorism, whether so-called or not. Accordingly, the Rule 33
motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion for a
judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial are denied.
The clerk is directed to furnish a copy of this opinion to all
parties.
SO ORDERED.
Dated : Brooklyn, New York
March 7, 2007
By: /s/ Charles P. Sifton (electronically signed)
United States District Judge

A letter of khalid awan canadian from jail, original facts

mohsin gondal 24.Apr.2008 14:34

khalid awan
khalid awan

Dear Sir / Madam

I am 46 years old, Canadian citizen and native of Pakistan (Muslim). I was an immigration consultant in Canada and also member of Canadian Bar Association as part of my business , I had an office in New York.

During 2001 immediately after the Sept 11, event the US govt arrested me on Oct 25, 2001 on anonymous call, as a material witness for the 9/11 world trade centre terrorist attack. A detail investigation by the FBI and USA Naval intelligence dept was conducted and I was cleared, but even then govt put me in front of Grand jury , and I was cleared and the case was dismissed by the Grand jury of the US Federal Court .

Approximately after 2 weeks , before I was released from custody the US Govt imposed a new charges of Fraud and money laundering , under the advice of my attorney , I pleaded guilty and I was sentenced to prison for five years (which was four years more, what I pleaded). In which I had already spent 3 years in Detention jail, during the case , I had about 14 months left to finishing my sentence ,(instead of appealing, I preferred to applied for Treaty Transfer to Canada, because if the case is in the appeal, defendant is not eligible for transfer back to his home country).

While at prison, I learned from the case manager Miss Hause, that my citizen was incorrect in the FBOP's (Federal Bureau of Prison) computer system as Pakistani instead of Canadian.

Its important to note , that all of my Canadian identifications (passport , citizenship card , S.I.N , Health card , Driving license etc) were under FBI's possession, with a great deal of concern, I wrote a letter to the Canadian Consulate in Buffalo, N.Y to notify such mistake and requested them to fix this problem. This is especially important for Treaty Transfer back to Canada.

The Canadian Consulate official sent a letter to the jail to correct my citizenship status, however FBOP ignored the request and the citizenship status in the FBOP computer still reflect Pakistani instead of Canadian (Note:- I would be required to obtain visa to visit Pakistan) .In contrast , the deportation letter received from US Immigration dept, Contained the correct citizenship status of Canada.

At the hindsight, I believe that the FBOP intentionally left the citizenship as Pakistani, so that they could retained me at their facility, while the govt is planning to file new charges against me 3rd time.

Approximately six weeks before my released date on Jan 30 ,2006 I was notified by the FBOP that I was being transferred from Allenwood , PA to MDC (Metropolitan Detention Centre) in Brooklyn N.Y, it was explained to me, that the purpose of this transfer was in preparation for deportation back to Canada, (after few days, I signed the immigration deportation papers, with my consular Miss Chen).

But immediately after my arriving to MDC Brooklyn, I discovered during a phone call with my family in Montreal, that RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) official had contacted my sister and brother-in-law regarding the whereabouts of my wife and my current situation, there was no explanation given by the RCMP official to the purpose of the call and he left his phone number and asked my wife to call him back immediately, my wife called the RCMP official and left messages in his voice mail. Then the official contacted my brother-in-law again and had asked him to tell my wife not to call again, because there is nothing good nor anything bad.

Meanwhile the AUSA ( Astt United States Attorney) office Investigator and FBI brought me to their office to be interrogated without an attorney present, even AUSA told in the court to the judge on March 16, 2006 that he arranged attorney for me before my arrival from Allenwood PA to MDC Brooklyn, N.Y, on Transcript; page 11, Transcript line No: 14 to 23.

AUSA:-

He (Khalid Awan) was writ in the cause of a grand jury investigation. He clearly had criminal exposure. So to protect his interest I made an application to the duty magistrate for counsel to be appointed.

THE COURT:-

Initially he was brought here by a Court to testify before the grand jury?

AUSA:-

That is correct, Your Honour.

THE COURT:-

When he arrived here, you made arrangements for an attorney to be pointed to request him?

AUSA:-

Yes, Your Honour.

This interrogation started with the AUSA office Investigator stating that my family will be arrested in Canada if I refused to answer their questions.

At this point I am certain that my family is in great danger for reasons that I am not aware of. I was scared that my family would be harassed by these people along with the Canadian RCMP official, I strongly believe that the RCMP is doing this intentionally in collaboration with FBI official to further harass me to admit charges, that I never committed.

Without knowledge of the reasons why the Canadian RCMP agency was involved. I was surprised that RCMP official directly approached my family instead of me without proper explanation, and its also shocked for me, that how RCMP got the phone number of my family (because before my arrest, I don't have any single record in any police dept, of any country).

I was intimated and pushed to the edge during this interrogation, I was determined to provide anything these USA officials wanted to make them happy even is the questions made no sense, because I want them to stop the harassment to my family.

On March 15, 2006 I completed the term of my imprisonment and was to be released from American Custody and deported back to Canada. Before that I was arrested again 3rd time, and charged with providing "material support to a foreign terrorist" and money laundering (to a organization and person, which are not designated by the USA govt and belongs to Sikh religion) , and with whom, I don't have any single common interest, because we both are from different countries and different religions.

These charges emerged while I was still in prison and without the capability of providing any type of support. It was even difficult for me to get enough financial assistance to pay legal fees. I could not have provided any material support while I was in prison for five years and I could not launder any money because I did not have any.

AUSA filed three counts of indictment against me.

Conspiracy to provide material support.

Provide a material support to the foreign terrorist.

Money laundering to support terrorism.

(Please note, that in my previous case govt charged me for money laundering and fraud from Jan 1999 to 2002 and "its mentioned in the plea-agreement by the AUSA that no further money laundering charges will be brought against defendant from Jan 1999 to April 2002" even then govt indict me for money laundering from 1998 to Nov 2001 (Which is double Jeopardy and violation of 5th Amendment of U.S Constitution.)

In Oct 2006, during pre-trial hearing on the motion's filed by my attorney the first two counts of my indictment were dismissed by the judge, stating that there is a lack of facts and figures.

After two weeks AUSA re-indicted me again. I believe this is a desperate act of the AUSA to cover up a huge embarrassment . Further this hastily drawn indictment was full of factual errors and creative legal theories.

Since I was first arrested by the American govt, I believe that I have been singled out, isolated `and discriminated against primarily because of my race and religion, in addition to the fact that I don't know any information that the American govt is trying to pressure out of me.

I do not understand the American laws and this is what led to my pleading guilty in the first case. I have difficulty understanding the new charges also.

I have been charged under, section 2339(a) of Title 18 of the United States code, which makes it illegal to provide material support to a foreign terrorist.

Please understand, I am not a terrorist, I do not know any terrorist and I have had no connections with or to any known or unknown terrorist. I have been incarcerated for last 5 years and I had no money to provide or launder.

The law enforcement have in America is pressuring me to provide information to them that I really do not have or know. I am a Canadian Citizen and nearly all of my family is in Canada, including my wife and kids. I don't know any information to tell them to help their investigation.

Because of this , I am being treated unfairly and my rights under the American constitution are being violated. I am being held here in further detention against my will for crimes which I could have never committed, because I was in prison.

I believe, that I am a victim of the discrimination that was outlined in the July 3, 2006 issue of Time magazine (Page 29, column 3). In this article section 2339(a) & (b) are discussed and criticized "as most suspects are charged under these two sections. However, the justice dept here in America admits that of the more than 218 guilty pleas that it has obtained, most are for minor investigation issues that are uncovered deeding the course of their terrorism investigation. This suggest, according to the article that the Attorney General's office have is not concerned about the rights or fairness or the manner in which it achieves convictions for the people they arrest. Furthermore, criticizes have noted that one of the patterns to emerge from these domestic prosecutions is that suspect seen too incompetent to carry out the deeds they are accused of. The Deputy Attorney General acknowledges that the Dept of Justice's goal is " preventions through prosecution's" and this is done with no regard for an individual's rights.

I agree that these guilty of terrorism should be prosecuted . But as the above mentioned article suggest , innocent people should not be targeted because of their race or religion.

I am not a terrorist and I should not be targeted and treated unfairly and unjustly.

I need your assistance desperately in my case, as I believe that I am being treated unjustly here. I would like to send you my attorney's contact information and provide you with legal documents related to my case, so that you may become more familiar with my situation.

Please also note, that I appeared in the court , for no guilty of my 2nd superseding indictment on Aug 02, 2006 and on Aug 03, 2006 FBOP officials placed me in the SHU (Segregation Housing Unit) out of these months, I placed in the SHU isolation from Jan 03, 2007 to March 6, 2007 for unknown "Pending Investigation" in these 215 days of my segregation and isolation, I don't have a single phone call access to my family, no legal calls to my attorney and Canadian Council, my legal mail opened in my absence, no medical treatment for my injured shoulder (even I went for hunger strike for 3 and half day) I harassed by the various jail officials and lot of other problems too which already been submitted in the attention of the FBOP higher authorities, but no action taken on them, after writing the court, instead of receiving the response or any action on my complaints, jail officials removed /moved me from MDC federal facility to Nassau County Jail .

My suffering has gone on for far too long, and I need your help to bring my suffering to an end. I want to return home to my family, because my imprisonment was injustice and will remain a great injustice forever.

May God bless you and be with you in your efforts to champion the cause of human rights, and the suffering of innocent prisoners and restore hope, faith and love to peoples all over the world.

Sincerely,

KHALID AWAN

FBOP NO. 50959-054